India-China Relations and Their Implications for the BRICS Summit

13 Sep 2026

Tags: International Relations   Neighborhood   Bilateral border relations

Source: The Hindu

Context: Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to India for the 18th BRICS Summit marks his first visit to India in seven years and comes amid gradual efforts to stabilise bilateral relations after the 2020 India-China border standoff.

  • The trajectory of India-China relations will significantly influence the functioning of BRICS, particularly as the grouping expands and faces growing geopolitical tensions.

The Changing BRICS Landscape

  • BRICS originated as BRIC, based on the concept of emerging economies identified by Goldman Sachs in 2001, with South Africa joining later.
  • Over the past 25 years, the economic trajectories of the original members have diverged significantly.
  • China has emerged as the world's second-largest economy, while India has recorded sustained growth but remains economically smaller than China.
  • Russia has faced economic and geopolitical challenges linked to its wars, while Brazil and South Africa have struggled with political and economic difficulties.
  • China emerged relatively stronger from the 2008 global financial crisis, strengthening its economic influence within BRICS.
  • China has simultaneously expanded its military capabilities and strategic ambitions, seeking greater influence in the Indo-Pacific and challenging U.S. predominance.

India-China Strategic and Border Tensions

  • India-China relations have been repeatedly affected by border disputes, including the Depsang and Chumar standoffs, the Doklam crisis in 2017, and the eastern Ladakh crisis beginning in 2020.
  • The June 2020 Galwan Valley clash resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian personnel and at least four Chinese personnel, marking one of the most serious confrontations between the two countries in decades.
  • Prolonged diplomatic and military negotiations subsequently resulted in troop disengagement in several areas in 2024, followed by measures aimed at stabilising bilateral relations.
  • Recent confidence-building measures include the resumption of direct flights, easing of visa restrictions, restarting the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, and relaxation of certain restrictions on Chinese investments.
  • Despite these developments, strategic trust remains weak, particularly because the broader boundary dispute remains unresolved.

Economic Frictions

  • The large India-China trade deficit remains a major concern for India.
  • Indian businesses continue to face concerns regarding market access and non-tariff barriers in China.
  • India has also increased scrutiny of Chinese companies, including action related to alleged tax evasion and regulatory violations.
  • Economic interdependence has therefore increased alongside strategic competition, creating a complex relationship of cooperation, competition and security concerns.

Impact of China-Pakistan Relations

  • Chinese support for Pakistan and perceived China-Pakistan strategic coordination have further complicated India-China relations.
  • The deterioration of strategic trust has been particularly significant after the 2020 border crisis and subsequent regional security developments.
  • Consequently, improvement in bilateral relations requires progress not only on economic issues but also on strategic trust and border management.

Trump Factor and Convergence of Interests

  • U.S. tariff policies under President Donald Trump have affected both India and China, creating a limited area of shared economic concern.
  • The two countries therefore have some common interest in responding to protectionism and disruptions to global trade.
  • Conflicts in West Asia have also generated common economic challenges for BRICS members through higher energy prices, inflation and supply-chain disruptions.
  • These developments create a potential opportunity for India and China to cooperate on issues affecting the broader Global South, despite their bilateral differences.

Different Visions of BRICS

  • China and Russia have at times promoted BRICS as an “anti-West” platform, while India prefers to describe it as “non-Western”.
  • The distinction is important: India seeks greater strategic autonomy and a multipolar order without defining the grouping primarily through opposition to the West.
  • India maintains strong and expanding partnerships with the United States, Europe, Australia, Canada and other Western countries for capital, technology, trade and mobility.
  • India therefore does not seek to transform BRICS into an anti-Western alliance.

India’s Strategic Objectives at the Summit

  • India can use BRICS to demonstrate that it has multiple strategic and economic partners rather than relying excessively on any single geopolitical bloc.
  • Cooperation with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia can strengthen investment and energy partnerships.
  • Russia remains an important energy supplier for India, while Brazil offers opportunities for cooperation in critical minerals.
  • BRICS can therefore provide India with additional options in areas such as energy security, technology, critical minerals and economic resilience.

India-China Convergence: Opportunity and Limits

  • The expansion of BRICS to 11 members has increased China's influence and also made India-China cooperation more consequential for the grouping.
  • China has supported BRICS expansion and played a significant role in transforming the grouping into a broader Global South platform.
  • However, divergent strategic interests, particularly over the West, the Indo-Pacific and regional security, can limit consensus.
  • The presence of countries with opposing relationships with the U.S., such as Iran and the UAE, further highlights the diversity of strategic interests within BRICS.
  • India therefore needs to balance cooperation with China while ensuring that BRICS remains focused on shared developmental and Global South concerns.

Significance for BRICS

  • Better India-China relations could strengthen BRICS’ ability to address common issues such as trade, energy security, financial reform, technology and development.
  • Persistent rivalry between its two largest Asian members could, conversely, reduce BRICS to a forum for competing geopolitical narratives.
  • The ability of India and China to build on recent bilateral stabilisation measures will therefore influence the credibility and effectiveness of BRICS as a multipolar platform.

Prelims Question

Q1. With reference to India-China relations and the BRICS grouping, consider the following statements:

  1. The unresolved India-China boundary dispute has implications for the ability of BRICS to build consensus on broader geopolitical issues.
  2. India’s preference for describing BRICS as “non-Western” rather than “anti-Western” reflects its broader policy of strategic autonomy.
  3. India considers BRICS primarily as a military-security alliance to counter U.S. influence in the Indo-Pacific.
  4. Greater India-China cooperation within BRICS could facilitate coordination on issues such as energy security, financial reform and development.

How many of the statements given above are correct?

(a) Only one
(b) Only two
(c) Only three
(d) All four

Answer: (c) Only three

Explanation:
Statements 1, 2 and 4 are correct. India views BRICS as a platform for cooperation among emerging economies and the Global South, rather than an anti-Western or military alliance. Hence, statement 3 is incorrect.

Mains Question

Q. “India-China relations represent a complex interplay of strategic competition, economic interdependence and selective cooperation.” In this context, examine how the trajectory of bilateral relations could shape the future relevance and strategic autonomy of BRICS.

Approach

Introduction

  • Briefly establish the evolution of BRICS from an economic grouping into a wider Global South platform amid changing global power dynamics.
  • Mention that India-China ties have simultaneously witnessed border tensions, economic interdependence and recent attempts at stabilisation.

Body

1. Why India-China relations matter for BRICS

  • China’s economic weight and India’s growing geopolitical significance make their relationship central to BRICS’ effectiveness.
  • Greater bilateral stability can facilitate cooperation on trade, development finance, energy security, technology and Global South concerns.
  • Persistent rivalry may turn BRICS into a platform for competing geopolitical narratives.

2. Areas of convergence

  • Shared concerns over protectionism, trade disruptions and supply-chain vulnerabilities.
  • Common interests in energy security, reform of global governance institutions and greater voice for developing countries.
  • BRICS provides India with diversified partnerships across energy, technology, investment and critical minerals.

3. Persistent constraints

  • Unresolved boundary dispute and weak strategic trust.
  • China-Pakistan strategic cooperation and competing interests in the Indo-Pacific.
  • Divergent approaches towards the United States: China/Russia’s occasional “anti-West” framing versus India’s preference for a “non-Western” and inclusive multipolar order.
  • Economic asymmetry and India’s trade deficit with China.

4. Way forward for India

  • Pursue bilateral stabilisation without compromising core security interests.
  • Strengthen border-management mechanisms and economic risk diversification.
  • Use BRICS selectively for developmental and Global South priorities rather than bloc politics.
  • Maintain strategic autonomy through simultaneous engagement with BRICS, the West and Indo-Pacific partnerships.

Conclusion

  • India-China cooperation need not imply strategic convergence. A relationship based on managed competition, border stability and issue-based cooperation can help BRICS remain an effective multipolar platform rather than an anti-Western bloc.